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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF SIMIAR PRIOR ACTS-PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-DEGRADATION AND SELF-IN-

cRnMNATIo.-[Utah]
During a
trial for statutory rape, the girl
subjected to the assault was called
as witness. The indictment charged
the act was committed July 27th.
The witness was asked by the prosecution, 'Did the defendant have
sexual intercourse with you at any
time between July 4th and July
27th?" Defense counrel objected
on grounds the evidence was immaterial, incompetent, and irrelevant, but was overruled. The witness claimed privilege against selfincrimination and self-degradation
under the Utah constitution and
statute. Upon denial of privilege
the witness refused to answer and
was imprisoned. On habeas corpus,
the majority of the court held: (1)
evidence of similar acts committed
prior to the one charged are not
here admissible; (2) the claim of
privilege against testifying should
have been allowed for such testimony is, (a) self-degrading and,
(b) self-incriminating. Sadleir v.
Young, 85 P. (2d) 810, (Utah,
1938).
Two judges concurred in part
and dissented in part. On the first

issue of 'admissibility,' the majority
theory was the jury would be prejudiced against the defendant by the
testimony if allowed to stand alone
and that the jury would be led to
convict the defendant of an offense
similar in character upon a different date, but not charged. This is
in contrast to the minority judges
who confirmed the holding but on
the theory that the testimony was
not pertinent to any material issue.
The general rule admits evidence
of prior similar acts to show intent,
knowledge, or identity. Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence
(1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988; State
v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 P. 215
(1900). If the majority theory is
-that the evidence is inadmissible
exclusively because of the resulting prejudice, it is untenable. For
where the evidence of a prior similar act is pertinent and relevant
to a material issue it is admissible.
State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 Pac.
270 (1913); People v. Patterson, 102,
Cal. 239, 36 Pac. 436 (1916); Commonwealth v. Bell, 166 Pa. 405, 31
Atl. 123 (1895). For a discussion
of "admissibility" see note, (1938)
28 J. C. L. 917.
On the issue of self-degradation
all judges concurred in the opin-
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ion that the testimony requested
would not be to a fact in issue or
to a fact from which the fact in
issue might be presumed and could
be excluded as self-defamatory.
The court's interpretation of the
statute does not conflict with the
general rule: a witness may be
bound to answer if the evidence is
relevant to a material issue being
tried though it tends to defame his
character. Wigmore, Evidence (2d
ed. 1923) §2255; Conway v. Clinton, 1 Utah 215, 220 (1875); Lohman v. People, 1 Comstock 379 (N.
Y. (1848); Polk v. State, 40 Ark.
482 (1883); Moor v. Dozier, 128 Ga.
90, 57 S. E. 110 (1907).
The minority's principal point of
divergence from the majority is on
the issue of privilege against selfincrimination.
Involved in the
problem is the jurisdictional and
procedural character of a juvenile
court. The court's attention is focused on the issue of whether the
constitutional privilege may be extended to minor witnesses when
their information would subject
them to juvenile court jurisdiction
exclusively.
Adhering to the negative of the
proposition, the minority would
deny minor misdemeanants a claim
of privilege.
Their theory is
grounded on the premise that constitutional immunity is a protection
from criminal proceedings only.
In Utah all minor misdemeanants
are subject exclusively to a juvenile court exercising equity jurisdiction solely. Since the crime of
which the ravished witness in the
instant case may be guilty, fornication, is merely a misdemeanor,
her severest fate would be a juvenile court proceedings. Rev. Stat.
Utah (1933) §§14-7-4, 103-51-5,
103-1-13, 14-7-25. The minority
theory is substantiated by the gen-
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eral rule in juvenile court proceedings. Where the record is fiot
transferrable to a criminal court
the party before the court may not
claim privilege. People v. Lewis,
260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353 (1932).
The proceedings being civil rather
than criminal the constitutional
safeguards in procedural matters
prescribed for criminal cases are
unnecessary.
Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198
(1905); Cinque v. Boyed, 99 Conn.
70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923); Wisenberg
v. Bradley, 209 Ia.. 813, 229 N. W.
205 (1930).
Holding to a more literal interpretation of the constitution, the
majority would grant privilege to
minor witnesses.
The majority
viewpoint, in contrast to the minority, pictures procedures and
punishments in juvenile court
equally as prejudicial to the interest of a witness as those of a criminal court. Sentence to a public
institution is as injurious to the
interest of a witness under eighteen as it is to an informant over
eighteen. Not only does this viewpoint find support in the constitution which recognizes no exception
based on age but as a practical
matter any such distinction is
purely arbitrary. Especially is this
true where the age factor simply
changes the label, of the actor by
naming him a juvenile delinquent
instead of a criminal misdemeanant. A youth seventeen should not
be denied privilege when it is
granted a hardened criminal testifying in regard to the same act.
People v. Lewis (dissent), supra.
-While the majority's view seems
to ignore the theory of juvenile
court equity proceedings, the minority doctrine, in its denial of
privilege on an age basis, is also
objectionable because of its arbi-
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trary character. It is suggested
that the two be resolved by using
as a criterion the qualitative character of the offense with which the
witness might be charged.
Most juvenile court legislation,
as well as bringing recognized
crimes within juvenile court jurisdiction, defines new offenses. For
example, jurisdiction is given over
children who are incorrigible, ungovernable, habitually disobedient,
or beyond control of their parents.
Under the qualitative theory privilege against testifying to crimes
only is granted, while as to these
new offenses it would be denied.
Some legislation confusedly bases
the new offenses on ordinary matu-n in se acts. Under the suggested theory privilege should be
granted in such circumstances also,
for a party accused of a malum in
se act is entitled to constitutional
rights regardless of age. Ex Parte
Mei, 122 N. J. Eq. 125, 198 Atl. 8
(1937).
The historical purpose of the
privilege was protection against (1)
inquisitorial methods, and (2)
crimination as to malum in se
crimes. Wigmore, Evidence, §§2252,
2263; note (1937) 27 J. Crim. L.
746; City of Mobile v. McCowan
Oil Co., 226 Ala. 228, 148 So. 402
(1933).
By limiting inquisitorial
methods to new offenses based on
acts expressly not malum in se the
historical purpose of the constitutional privilege is preserved. Thus
the qualitative theory, though it
limits the juvenile court procedures, is desirable for it fulfills the
constitutional intent. At the same
time the new juvenile court procedures remain intact as regards
those new offenses which are its
principal objective. The new criterion is necessary for the spirit of
constitutional privilege should be

reconciled with the juvenile court
procedure on a more logical basis
than age if confusion is to be
avoided.
J. KENzmvn BAIRD.
EVmENCE--CoPROBORATION 6F Ex-

TRA-JumciAL CozmsI1oT.-[Utah]
An abundance of legal learning has
been devoted to tvo aspects of an
extra-judicial confession, that is,
one not made before a magistrate
or in open court: (1) the question
of whether such a confession independently establishes corpus delicti, and (2) if not, need the evidence introduced to establish it be
consistent with the confession, or
can the latter be corroborated by
evidence distinct from that which
established corpus delicti. These
problems arose recently in a Utah
infanticide case. State v. Johnson,
95 Utah 572, 83 P. (2d) 1010 (1938).
Declaring a mere extra-judicial
confession insufficient to establish.
corpus delicti the majority of the
court stated: "There must be evidence, independent of the confession, corroborative thereof, consistent therewith, forming a basis
or foundation for the confession,
. . . before the confession may be
considered by the jury as evidence
of guilt." Elaborating the rule, the
court observed that there must be
proof aliunde the confession that
the crime has been committed, or
proof of some fact or circumstance
otherwise confiriatory of the confession. These requisites being
present it would be proper that the
jury "may consider the confession
in evidence, not only in determining the question of defendant's
guilty participation in the crime,
but also in determining whether
the crime was actually committed."
This proposition permits the estab-
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lishment of corpus delicti by the 'Wigmore, Evidence (lst, ed., 1904)
confession along with collateral §2070.
Most jurisdictions in this country
evidence, each supplementing any
deficiency in the other. It is the have adopted the rule requiring
position of the dissent, however, corroboration, and the majority of
that a confession has no place in these have declared that the evithe determination of a death by dence must concern the corpus delicti, though in a few states any
criminal agency, which must be
evidence which tends to produce
established by evidence complete
confidence in the truth of the conand independent thereof. As a fession is considered sufficient. 3
corollary, the minority believe that, Wigmore, Evidence (1st Ed., 1904)
though the evidence which estab§2071; Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426
lishes the corpus delicti be incon(1856).
sistent with the 'confession, the
The independent evidence of
latter may still be accorded the corpus delicti may be either direct
jury's consideration if there is other or circumstantial. Most states do
evidence corroborative of the con- not require that the corpus delicti
fession.
This last observation be proved by evidence which enseemingly conflicts with the ra- tirely excludes a consideration of
tionale of the rule requiring inde- the confession, but hold that the
pendent proof of corpus delicti. confession may be used to strengthThe purpose of this rule is to
en such evidence. There is conprotect persons who, for divers siderable disagreement among the
reasons, confess to crimes which courts on this point, but it is genthey did not commit. It would aperally recognized that it is suffipear that this purpose becomes cient if, taken together with the
frustrated if a confession, the tenor confession, it satisfies the jury beof which is inconsistent with the yond a reasonable doubt that the
evidence establishing corpus delicoffense was committed, and that
ti, is still accorded judicial recog- defendant committed it. 2 Wharnition by attempting to prove it ton, Crim. Evidence (11 ed., 1935)
with collateral evidence.
1072, §641. See contra: Burrows
From early common law to the v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029
present this problem has been
(1931) (murder; clear and confraught with complexity. In 1784 vincing proof aliunde, of corpus
it was held that a conviction could delicti required).
be sustained on the uncorroborated
Some states have adopted the
confession alone. R. v. Wheeling, rule in statutory form. For ex1 Leach Cr. L., 4 ed., 311. During ample, Arkansas: "A confession
the nineteenth century the question of a defendant, unless made in
arose frequently, and two rules open court, will not warrant a conwere proposed: (1) the corroborviction, unless accompanied with
ative evidence might be of any sort other proof that such offense was
whatever; (2) it must relate specicommitted."
Pope's Stat. Ark.
fically to the corpus delicti. Of §4081, Crim. Code §239; and New
these two rules, the latter is perYork goes even farther and exhaps the more general, although in tends the rule to judicial, as well
England and Ireland it seems to
as extra-judicial confessions: "A
be restricted to homicide cases. 3 confession of a defendant, whether
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in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be
given in evidence against him,
. . . but is not sufficient to warrant his conviction, without additional proof that the crime charged
has been committed." N. Y. Crim.
Code §395.
The reasons given for requiring corroboration of extra-judicial
confessions are that people sometimes confess to crimes that have
never been committed at all, in
order to protect others, or to prevent investigation into another
crime, or merely for publicity, or
because of mental derangement.
Blackstone, in speaking of confessions made without due caution,
said: "They are the weakest and
most suspicious of all testimony;
ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes, promise of favor
or menaces; seldom rendered accurately or repeated with due precision, and incapable in their nature of being disproved by negative
evidence."
4 Blackstone,. Commentaries (Cooley's 3rd Ed., 1884),
§355. The rule is in accord with
the so-called humaneness of the
criminal law.
It is hardly to be doubted that
extra-judicial confessions are to be
regarded most suspiciously, but
there is some disagreement among
the authorities as to whether corroboration should be required as a
part of the law of evidence. In
R. v. Unkles, Ir.,R. .8 C. L. 50, 58,
the rule was described as more a
judicial practice than a part of the*
law of evidence. "A party accused
of homicide ought not to be convicted on his own confession merely, without proof of the "finding of
the dead body or evidence aliunde
that the party alleged to have been
murdered is in fact dead."
The suggested distinction be-

tween a "judicial practice" and a
rule of the law of evidence is apparently that one convicted merely
on the basis of an uncorroborated
confession in a jurisdiction where
corroboration is required as a part
of the law of evidence could secure a reversal in an appellate
court by indicating the absence of
corroboration, whereas in a jurisdiction where the "rule" was regarded merely as a "judicial practice" the defendant would have to
show bias or lack of judicial attitude on the part of the judge. In
other words, the "judicial practice"
formula would leave much more
discretion in the hands of the individual judge than the "evidence"
formula.
Wigmore suggests that the supposed danger the evidence rule is
intended to guard against is greatly exaggerated, and emphasizes
that warning can be given the jury
by counsel or by the judge, of the
caution to be exercised in considering an extra-judicial confession.
He condemns the rule as providing
a means whereby unscrupulous
counsel may trip the judge by some
refinement of verbiage and thereby obtain reversals. 3 Wigmore,
Evidence (1st Ed., 1904) §2073.
Why this particular rule should
be singled out for condemnation as
an obstruction to justice is difficult
to see. There are countless other
pitfalls for the unwary judge; the
criminal law is full of technicalities. But the technicalities are designed to save the innocent from
unjust or misguided conviction. To
trust to the mercy and beneficence
of a judge in a matter so vital as
the requirement of corroboration
seems to be exposing the defendant to an unnecessary and unjustifiable risk. Surely we may presume that our judges will know
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the law and will not be caught off
guard any more in the application
of this rule than in the application
of any of the other rules of law.
An interesting modification of
the rule is that which varies the
amount of corroboration required
according to the severity of the
crime charged. In England now,
apparently one may be convicted
of any crime other than a capital
offense upon his own uncorroborated extra-jud-.cial confession, 1
R. C. L. 586, n. 5, while some other
jurisdictions require corroboration
for all felonies and serious crimes,
but not for the lesser ones. 1 R. C.
L. 586, n. 4. While such procedure
may expedite the business before
the courts, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that extreme caution should be used in convicting,
even for the lesser crimes, on the
mere uncorroborated extra-judicial
confession of a defendant. Theoretically, at least, a man is entitled
to as careful trial where the penalty is light as where it is heavy.
W. R. BERNAYS.
EXCLUSION OF NEGROES FROM
JURY-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH

DIsCRnVINATION.-[Fed-

eral] In 1875 Congress enacted a
statute in compliance with the 14th
Amendment, providing that "no
citizen . . . shall be disqualified
for service as grand or petit juror
in any court of the United States,
or of any State, on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude. 8 U. S. C. A. 43 (1875).
Since this enactment it has become
well settled that discrimination
against negroes in the selection of
jurors is ground for reversal of the
conviction of a negro. What constitutes discrimination within the
meaning of this statute depends, of
,course, upon the interpretation

placed thereon by the United
States Supreme Court. Moreoveri,
since the decisions of that tribunal
are binding upon the state courts
(McIntosh v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 469,
128 P. 735 (1912)) and the accused
can always obtain relief in the federal court (he may petition the
Supreme Court for certiorari, and
even if refused could probably obtain relief in the lower federal
court by habeas corpus-28 U. S.
C. A. 344 (1925); Hale v. Crawford, 65 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 1st,
1933), it would seem that the degree of impartiality required by
the Supreme Court would constitute the minimum to which the
states must accede.
The Supreme Court has enunciated the general principle that
when systematic exclusion of negroes from jury service is established, unconstitutional discrimination is shown. For a review of
the decisions see Carter v. Texas,
177 U. S. 442 (1900); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); and
comment (1934) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 498.
Of course, intentional discrimination against negroes, if admitted by
the jury commissioner is clearly
sufficient. In Carrick v. State, 41
Okla. Cr. 336, 274 Pac. 896 (1929),
the determining factor in establishing discrimination was the admission by the jury commissioner that
he would never put a negro on the
jury list because he had never seen
a qualified negro.
But intentional discrimination, if
denied, can be shown by circumstantial evidence.
It is in this
sphere that the d.fficult factual issue arises. Two main elements
must be shown to establish discrimination. As a prime requisite
the absence of negroes from the
jury over a long period of time
must be established. This element,
while comparatively easy of proof,

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES

is not sufficient of itself. Pollard
v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. 299, 125 S. W.
390 (1910); Mitchell v. State, 105
Tex. Cr. 297, 288 S. W. 224 ((1926);
Ryan v. State, 123 S. W. (2d) 659
(1939).
Secondly, it must be
proved that there were negroes
qualified to serve on the jury in the
particular locality.
This factor
alone is also insufficient, but
coupled with the time element has
proved sufficient. In Lee v. State,
163 Md. 56, 161 Atl. 284, the evidence that the negro population of
Baltimore county, a large proportion of which were fully qualified,
was about one-tenth of the total
population, together with the long,
unbroken absence of negroes as
jurors was held to show unconstitutional exclusion of negroes
from jury service. Of course, as
the proportion of qualified negroes
increases, the time element diminr
ishes in importance, and vice
versa. Thus, the tests are mutually
supplementary.
Just what percentage of qualified negroes in a
locality must be shown has never
been decided by the Supreme
Court, but several states have expressed their opinion People v.
Hines, 81 P. (2d) 1048 (Cal. 1938)
(conviction reversed, the evidence
showing seven per cent qualified
negroes); Bruster v. State, 40
Okla. Cr. 25, 266 Pac. 486 (1928)
(conviction affirmed, the evidence
failing to show the percentage of
qualified negroes);. Bonaparte v.
State, 65 Fla. 287, 61 So. 633 (1913)
(conviction reversed, the evidence
showing at least one thousand negroes qualified).
The greatest obstacle for the defendant to surmount in -establishing discrimination is to prove that
there are negroes properly qualified to serve as jurors in the particular locality. This task inheres
with more difficulty than a mere
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showing of a large negro population. The qualifications necessary
for a juror vary slightly in the different states, but the requirements
generally found among the southern states include residence, literacy, voting, lack of a criminal record, intelligence, and good moral
character. Arbitrary determinations by jury commissioners that
no negroes meet the intelligence or
good moral charactef requirements,
have not been tolerated by the Supreme Court. Neal v. Delaware,
103 U. S. 370 (1880)..
In addition to the difficulties
arising from the discretionary
powers vested in the jury commissioners, the burden of proof is on
the defendant to show discrimination. Briscoe v. State, 106 Tex. Cr.
478, 293 S. W. 573 (1927); Mitchell
v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. 478, 288 S. W.
224 (1926); Wilborn v. State, 11
Tex. Cr. 299, 12 S. W. (2d) 578
(929). However, this obstacle is
not as serious as might seem, because the issue of discrimination
against negroes in jury service
turns on the sufficiency of the evidence. Being a question of fact
involving the burden of proof, the
Supreme Court sees fit, in this class
of cases, to review the facts and
draw reasonable inferences and
presumptions. So if the defendant
can show sufficient evidence to
make out a prima facie case, the
burden of proof may shift to the
state, thus relieving the defendant
of the heavy -burden which the
states impose upon him. In Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880),
the Supreme Court had before it
a case involving the conviction of
a negro on grounds of discrimination. The Supreme Court held
that the allegations presented a
prima facie case of discrimination
which shifted the burden of proof
to the state, and failure of the state
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to rebut the presumption warranted reversal. See Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935), to
the same effect. The difference
between the interpretation of such
a case by a state court and the
Supreme Court is frequently one
of burden of proof, the state court
holding that the defendant hag not
met the burden of proof, and the
Supreme Court*holding that it has,
and that the failure of a state to
rebut warrants a reversal.
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court sets the minimum requirements, it is interesting to analyze a recent case of discrimination. In Pierce v. State of Louisiana, 9 S. Ct. 537 (1939), handed
down by Justice Black, the distinction between the holding of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, and the
United States Supreme Court, is
a difference of burden of proof.
The evidence of twelve witnesses
showed that for twenty years, only
one negro had been called for jury
service, and that the population of
the Parish was composed of from
one-quarter to one-half negroes,
and of these negroes, only twentynine per cent were illiterate. The
Supreme Court held that the defendant had sufficiently met the
burden of proof by this evidence
to shift it to the state, and the failure of the state to rebut warranted
reversal. The Louisiana Supreme
Court had affirmed the conviction,
emphasizing the fact that there
were four negroes included in the
list of 300. In view of the fact that
a large proportion of the negroes
were disqualified because they
were illiterate, the court was of
the opinion that the number of
negroes on the list was not disproportionate to the number of whites
on the list and that the defendant
had not established discrimination.
Both courts seem to have deter-

mined the issue on the basis of.
how many negroes were on the
list. Justice Black went to great
pains to show that of the three negroes on the list, one was dead,
and the name of another was listed
incorrectly, leaving only one negro
who had been called, for many
years. The difference in the interpretation of these facts, was the
determining factor, resulting in opposite decisions by the two courts.
The interpretation which Justice
Black puts on the evidence, is supported by the trial judge's finding
of discrimination in the original
petit jury. The trial judge dismissed the jury, and ordered that a
new impartial jury be drawn. This
impartial jury convicted the defendant. But the trial judge overruled the motion to quash the indictment because of discrimination,
although the indictment was returned by a grand jury drawn
from the same panel as the original
petit jury. The theory of the trial
judge, in so doing, was that the
constitutional rights of the accused
were not affected by a discriminatory grand jury because the mere
presentment of the indictment is
not evidence of guilt, but merely
brings the accused before the
court. The trial judge was clearly
wrong in his contention as Justice
Black points out, because under
the Louisiana constitution there
must be an indictment to hold a
man for a crime. Under the 14th
Amendment and the Congressional statute of 1875, and a Louisiana
statute, the indictment should have
been quashed if qualified negroes
were systematically excluded because of their color. The evidence,
being sufficient to quash the petit
jury, was sufficient to quash the
indictment. Farrow v. State, 91
Miss. 509, 45 So. 619 (1908).
BETTY BOOTH.

